Embryo personhood and how it affects disposal procedures in IN vitro fertilization by Nyakundi Tony Areri
 
 
EMBRYO PERSONHOOD AND HOW IT AFFECTS DISPOSAL PROCEDURES IN 
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION  
  
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Bachelor of Laws Degree, 



























I, NYAKUNDI TONY ARERI do hereby declare that this research is my original work and 
that to the best of my knowledge and belief, it has not been previously, in its entirety or in 
part, been submitted to any other university for a degree or diploma. Other works cited or 


















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION........................................................................................................................vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................... viii 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. ix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. x 
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS.................................................. xi 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ...............................................................................................xii 
LIST OF CASES .................................................................................................................. xiii 
CHAPTER ONE; BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Statement of Problem. .................................................................................................. 5 
1.3 Justification of the Study. ............................................................................................. 5 
1.4 Statement of Objectives. ............................................................................................... 6 
1.5 Research Questions. ...................................................................................................... 6 
1.6 Literature Review. ........................................................................................................ 6 
1.7 Theoretical Framework. ............................................................................................... 8 
1.8 Hypothesis. ..................................................................................................................... 9 
1.9 Research Design and Methodology. ............................................................................ 9 
1.10 Limitations. .................................................................................................................. 10 
1.11 Chapter Breakdown.................................................................................................... 10 
1.11.1 Chapter One ......................................................................................................... 10 
1.11.2 Chapter Two ........................................................................................................ 10 
1.11.3 Chapter Three ...................................................................................................... 10 
1.11.4 Chapter Four........................................................................................................ 10 
1.11.5 Chapter Five ......................................................................................................... 10 




CHAPTER TWO; PERSONS OR PROPERTY? .............................................................. 12 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 12 
2.2 Embryos as Property .................................................................................................. 13 
2.2.1 Natural Rights ...................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.2 Utilitarian Theory ................................................................................................ 14 
2.2.3 Personality Theories ............................................................................................ 16 
2.3 Personhood Theory ..................................................................................................... 18 
2.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 19 
CHAPTER THREE; COMPARATIVE STUDY ............................................................... 20 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 20 
3.2 Costa Rica and El Salvador ....................................................................................... 20 
3.2.1 Costa Rica ............................................................................................................. 20 
3.2.2 El Salvador ........................................................................................................... 22 
3.3 United States ................................................................................................................ 23 
3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 25 
CHAPTER FOUR; IN VITRO FERTILIZATION IN KENYA AND REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS .................................................................................................................................. 27 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 27 
4.2 In vitro fertilization in Kenya .................................................................................... 27 
4.3 Review of the In Vitro Fertilization Bill (2014) ......................................................... 28 
4.3.1 Summary of the Bill ............................................................................................. 28 
4.3.1.1 Part I ................................................................................................................. 28 
4.3.1.2 Part II ................................................................................................................ 29 
4.3.1.3 Part III .............................................................................................................. 29 
4.3.1.4 Part IV............................................................................................................... 29 
4.3.1.5 Part V ................................................................................................................ 30 
4.3.1.6 Part VI............................................................................................................... 30 
v 
 
4.3.1.7 Part VII ............................................................................................................. 30 
4.3.1.8 Part VIII ........................................................................................................... 30 
4.3.1.9 Part IX............................................................................................................... 30 
4.3.2 Constitutional Concerns...................................................................................... 30 
4.4 IVF as Part of Reproductive Freedom ...................................................................... 31 
4.5 International Framework for Reproductive Rights ................................................ 32 
4.5.1 International Treaties and Conventions protecting Reproductive Health..... 33 
4.5.1.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) .......................................... 33 
4.5.1.2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
33 
4.5.1.3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) ........................................................................................................... 33 
4.4.2  Position of International Human Rights Law on Personhood ............................. 34 
5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 34 
CHAPTER 5; CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................ 35 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 35 
5.2 Summary of the Study ................................................................................................ 35 
5.2.1 Chapter One ......................................................................................................... 35 
5.2.2 Chapter Two ........................................................................................................ 35 
5.2.3 Chapter Three ...................................................................................................... 36 
5.2.4 Chapter Four........................................................................................................ 36 
5.3 Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 36 
5.3.1 Need for a National Policy on IVF ..................................................................... 36 
5.3.2 Need for a legislation on the in vitro fertilization ............................................. 36 
5.3.3 Need to align any law passed with the Constitution ......................................... 36 
5.3.4 Need to provide protection for contractual agreements entered by persons . 37 
5.3.5 Need for more studies on IVF in Kenya ............................................................ 37 
5.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 37 
vi 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 39 
Books ................................................................................................................................... 39 
Journal Articles .................................................................................................................. 39 
Online Sources .................................................................................................................... 41 
Institutional Authors .......................................................................................................... 41 
UN Reports and Publications ............................................................................................ 42 
National Legislation ........................................................................................................... 42 






To my mum for her morning texts, unmatched wit and candour, inspiring strength and grace as 
well as countless personal sacrifices that make me a better student, brother, son and friend. 



























This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance, support and insightful 
comments from my supervisor, Jonah Mngola. 
I am also thankful to my classmates for their comments and motivation during this study and 
for helping me in my personal and academic growth for the time I have known them. 
My sincere gratitude also goes to my siblings Doreen, Tracy and Arnold for the all the love, 
laughter and strength I needed to complete this work. 
Finally, I am indebted to my parents, Kellan and George, for their support and sacrifice that 
lights my path. I am eternally grateful to them for constantly inspiring me to hard work, 


















Assisted reproduction technologies are fairly new to Kenya and therefore have not been 
subjected to the necessary legal scrutiny. This is especially true of in vitro fertilization which 
describes the process where the female egg is fertilized in a laboratory after being retrieved 
from the lady and the now fertilized egg is guided into the uterus of either the biological mother 
or a surrogate who carries it to term. This study aims to bridge the gap in academic and 
particularly legal commentary on the issue especially as regards the disposition of embryos. 
The issue of disposal of embryos raises the basic question of how the legal system sees the 
embryo. The Kenyan Constitution views the embryo as persons and this study analyses the 
effect of this personhood approach. Any legislation that pertains to in vitro fertilization will 
therefore have to consider this key issue when considering matters such as disposal, storage 
and conveyance. However, as the study will demonstrate, this should not translate to excessive 
measures such as absolute bans since the practice is part of the greater framework on 
reproductive freedom. 
The study investigates various jurisdictions to ascertain their approach to in vitro fertilization 
and finds that it is possible to preserve reproductive rights while remaining true to the 
Constitution.  To achieve this, the study recommends careful legislative drafting and balanced 
interpretation of rights as has been the case in various jurisdictions the world over. Fidelity to 
the Constitution is never a reason for unnecessary restrictions on basic rights and this is true in 
this case as well. 
It is the recommendation of this study that Parliament should pass laws to adequately legitimize 
the practice of in vitro fertilization in the country and provide ethical and medical standards on 
the same. The reproductive rights and freedoms of couples should also be respected in drafting 
of the same. The study also recommends that more research should be done on the practice in 
Kenya in order to provide better informed legislative, judicial and executive decision making. 
Finally, this study has adopted a qualitative approach based on journal articles, case law, books 
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CHAPTER ONE; BACKGROUND  
1.1   Introduction 
This study aims at producing the first legal commentary on the issue of disposal of embryos in 
Kenya. It will investigate the effect of conferring personhood to the embryo as per Article 26(2) 
of the Constitution of Kenya, (2010) which asserts that life begins at conception. This is an 
articulation of the Kenyan view towards personhood and when it begins. Nevertheless, it is 
rather inappropriate to assume that this provision is straightforward in its application.  
The term person according to Tauer refers to the “sort of beings who are moral agents, have 
moral rights and who are respected simply because they exist”.1 Legally, personhood is 
ascribed to these persons depending on the legislative conception of the beginning of life. As 
stated earlier, in the 2010 Constitution, this is at conception2. This concept is important as it 
determines the limits of any activity involving the unborn including but not limited to, in vitro 
fertilization. 
There is general consensus that the term “embryo” refers to the earliest stages of development 
of a fertilized oocyte3 usually three weeks after conception but before the entity develops into 
a foetus.4 
At least in Kenya, there is little by way of judicial consideration or even academic commentary 
on the subject of embryos outside the confines of termination of pregnancies. Despite this 
limited academic focus, there have been unmistakable developments in science and technology 
and there are now diverse ways of conception.5 Aside from sexual intercourse, couples, or 
indeed individuals, are able to cause pregnancy through assisted reproductive technologies 
which include in vitro fertilization.  
                                                           
1 Tauer C, ‘Personhood and human embryos and fetuses’, 10 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1985), 
255. 
2 Article 26(2), Constitution of Kenya, (2010) 
3 The female gamete. 
4 http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/in-depth/prenatal-care/art-20045302 on 
18th March 2016. 
See also, Australian Government, Human Embryo’ – A Biological Definition, December 2005, 1, available at 
https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/file/research/embryos/reports/humanembryo.pdf on 17th February, 
2016. 
5 Kindregan PC, ‘The current state of assisted reproduction law’, 34 Family Advocate, (2011), 1. 
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In vitro fertilization refers to a procedure where a female egg is fertilized in a laboratory after 
being retrieved from the lady.6 The now fertilized egg is guided into the uterus of either the 
biological mother or a surrogate who carries it to term.7 To increase chances of success, 
multiple eggs are extracted from the woman in an invasive, painful and expensive procedure.8 
Due to this reason, the excess eggs are stored through cryopreservation9 for use in other 
cycles.10 
One of the options available to the progenitor for the embryos in cryostorage is to destroy these 
embryos and therein lies the controversy that this work aims to investigate.11  
One party to the issue is the group that ascribes to the sanctity of the embryo by virtue of its 
status as a human.12 This school of thought holds that as life begins at conception, so does 
                                                           
6 http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/basics/definition/prc-20018905 on 18th March 
2016. 
7 See also Kindregan ‘PC, The current state of assisted reproduction law’, 10. 
8 http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/basics/what-you-can-expect/prc-20018905   
on 18th February. 
9 Cryopreservation is the process of freezing biological material (in this case the pre-implantation embryo) in 
liquid nitrogen in order to prevent tissue degeneration. Cryopreservation delays further development while the 
embryo is in frozen storage in case there is a later desire to achieve pregnancy See 
http://www.cryogenetics.com/products-and-services/cryopreservation/  on 18th March 2016. 
10 Frozen storage of embryos raises a separate set of moral and legal questions in itself. Storing these embryos is 
done at a contractual cost and is subject to the same contractual arrangements as any contract for bailment of 
goods. Seemingly, this implies that the embryos constitute property subject to whatever connotations that 
accompany this status. This creates a moral quandary especially for those who assert that embryos are persons. 
The other potential problem is determining the status of these frozen embryos on occurrence of events such as 
divorce or death. Who owns them if couples divorce? If a couple dies and leaves the embryos behind, does the 
estate inherit the embryo or does the embryo inherit the estate? These are but some of the practical issues that law 
or the courts will have to decide sooner rather than later. Nevertheless, the object of this study remains the disposal 
of embryos since it possesses a sense of immediacy compared to storage. The issue of storage of embryos 
especially on issues to do with family and succession law, is contingent on the occurrence of other events such as 
divorce or death. Disposal of embryos is part and parcel of the in vitro fertilization process and for this reason, is 
especially relevant to this discussion.  
For more on issues to do with the freezing of embryos, see Robertson JA, ‘Precommitment strategies for 
disposition of frozen embryos’, 991-995. 
11 Lyerly A et al., ‘Factors that affect infertility patients decisions about disposition of frozen embryos’, 85 
Fertility & Sterility, (2006), 1623, 1628. 
12 Carbone and Cahn interestingly call this group, “embryo fundamentalists”. See Carbone J, Cahn N, ‘Embryo 
fundamentalism’, 18 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, (2009), 1016. 
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personhood and therefore we are bound to protect the legal right these embryos have to life and 
to treat the embryo in any contrary manner is an affront to inherent human dignity.13 This 
absolutist view is by no means limited to the religious among us, but also to academics such as 
Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen who argue who argue that the fact that an entity’s 
potential to develop into a human with similar capacities such as thought means they have 
already been conferred personhood.14  
This therefore means that production of multiple embryos and/or their subsequent destruction 
is both immoral and illegal. 
On the other side are a variety of groups who believe that the embryo has no ascertainable 
rights to enjoy or interests to be protected.15 Proponents of this school of thought use this as 
justification for any procedure carried out on the embryo before it is implanted and by 
extension, this includes in vitro fertilization and the disposal of embryos.16 As pointed out by 
Carbone and Cahn this way of thought suggests that embryos enjoy the status conferred upon 
them by those who create them who are therefore justified in attributing whatever value they 
see fit on the embryo.17 
However skewed the moral dynamics of this conversation are, what is clear is that this is not 
merely an academic debate. Legislators and courts have been called to decide on the status of 
the unborn several times over and have adopted varied approaches. The result is the adoption 
of different frameworks for treatment of these embryos. The dominant frameworks regard 
embryos either as property as persons.18 
Treating embryos as persons means regarding them as beings with similar inherent rights to 
other humans the most important being the right to life. On the other hand, treating them as 
                                                           
13 Momeyer R, ‘Embryos, stem cells, morality and public policy: difficult connections’, 31 Capital University 
Law Review, (2002), 93, 94. 
14 George R, Tollefsen C, Embryo: A Defence of Human Life Doubleday, 2008, 75. 
15 Coleman CH, ‘Procreative liberty and contemporaneous choice: an inalienable rights approach to frozen embryo 
disputes’, 84 Minnesota Law Review, (1999), 55, 67. 
16 Robertson JA, ‘Symbolic issues in embryo research’, 25 Hastings Center Report (1995), 37, as cited in 
Howsepian AA, 33 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, (2008), 140-157.  
17 Carbone J, Cahn N, ‘Embryo fundamentalism’, 1015. See also; 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/us/04embryo.html on 17th February. 
18 Berg JW, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 Wake Forest Law 
Review, (2005), 162 
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property would mean that they have no rights to be protected and as such are subject to the 
control of their progenitors. Jurisprudence around the world has endorsed either view based on 
the unique law and culture of each jurisdiction although the issue is far from settled. In the 
United States for example, it has been decided that the Constitution gives no rights to the 
unborn and therefore embryos cannot be persons.19 However, reluctance to assign property 
status to these embryos influenced the same Court to rule that the embryos instead occupy an 
interim category between persons and property.  
This goes to show that there is little or no certainty about the status of these embryos.  
Further jurisprudence from South America, for example, in Artavia Murillo et al. (“in vitro 
fertilization”) v. Costa Rica addressed the production of embryos.20 In this issue at the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the Court considered a Costa Rican ban on the use of in 
vitro fertilization based on Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights that 
provides for the protection of the right to life “…in general from the moment of conception”. 
Its aim was to ostensibly prevent the perishing of embryos. The Court however struck out the 
ban stating that Article 4 should not be understood as an absolute right that justifies the negation 
of other rights but a balance between competing rights and interests.21 
In Kenya, the issue of disposal of embryos has scarcely been discussed either through 
Parliament or scholarly work. In attempt to fill this gap, Parliament proposed the In Vitro 
Fertilization Bill with substantive positions on prohibited activities when dealing with embryos 
and other issues such as rights of parents, donors and children.22 However, The Bill remained 
silent on issues related to the production and disposal of embryos.23 The absence of any 
legislative or ministerial policy certainly does not help in advancing clarity on the issue.24  
                                                           
19 Davis v. Davis, (1992), Supreme Court of Tennessee, United States.  
20 Artavia Murillo et al. (“in vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, IACtHR, Judgement of November 28, 2012, 
(Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs). 
21 Artavia Murillo et al. (“in vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 263. 
22 Part III and IV, In-Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
23 Only the Kenyan Christian Health Professionals Forum pointed out this glaring gap. See 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/KCPF-IVF-Bill-Health-Ministry/-/1056/2707136/-/qeutlyz/-/index.html on 29th 
February, 2016. 
24 Passing of the In-vitro Fertilization Bill (2014) stalled after assertions by the Departmental Committee on Health 
that the anticipated Health Bill (2015) would cover issues in the Bill and therefore there was no need to enact the 
same. According the Committee, the proposed Health Bill (2015) provides powers to the Cabinet Secretary of 
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This lack of clear direction by Parliament poses the risk of an unregulated industry with no 
clear delimitation of rights and liabilities of various parties involved in the in vitro fertilization 
process. 
It is the aim of this study to provide the first academic commentary on the issue.  
1.2   Statement of Problem. 
The problem is that there is a lacuna not only in Kenyan law but also in academic discussion 
on the effect that the extension of personhood to embryos will have to assisted reproductive 
technologies especially regarding disposal of embryos. This research will aim at filling this 
gap. 
1.3   Justification of the Study. 
This study is justified by the observable rise of in vitro fertilization practices in the country 
without corresponding policy development. While it is difficult to access credible statistics, 
estimates from the Nairobi IVF Centre indicate that 400 hundred babies were delivered at the 
clinic in 2014 alone.25 This is remarkable considering the first test tube baby was delivered as 
recently as 2006.26 
The foregoing means that our legal system has to be sensitive to pertinent issues arising from 
the practice. One of the standout issues is about the status of the embryo and the practicality of 
applicable laws. Sooner rather than later, the country will be forced to decide on a proper 
framework on assisted reproductive technologies and therefore this study is justified on the 
basis of contributing to a sober and inclusive discussion. Adding any measure of certainty to 
the field of assisted reproductive technologies will help in the creation of a policy framework 
to regulate the practice of in vitro fertilization as well as assist in the decision making process 
that couples interested in the procedure undergo. 
                                                           
Health to create rules regarding assisted reproductive technologies including in vitro fertilization. As a result, 
there is no need for a new Act. See National Assembly Hansard Report, 15th April 2015, 19. 
25 http://nairobiivf.com/ on 17th February, 2016. See also http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenyans-embrace-In-
Vitro-Fertilisation/-/1056/2515898/-/gah6db/-/index.html on 17th February, 2016. 
26 See above. 
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1.4   Statement of Objectives.  
1. To investigate the jurisprudential debate informing the status of embryos and how it 
will relate to Kenya. 
2. To investigate judicial approaches to cases involving disposal of embryos. 
3. To make recommendations on an applicable legal framework on assisted reproductive 
technologies specifically regarding disposal of embryos. 
1.5   Research Questions. 
1. Is it possible to reconcile the jurisprudential debate influencing Article 26(2) of the 
Constitution of Kenya, (2010) and the practicality necessary in in vitro fertilization? 
2. What legal effect does this extension of personhood have on the practice of in vitro 
fertilization? 
3. Can the right to start a family be construed from the Constitution and if so, do 
limitations placed on in vitro fertilization infringe on this right? 
1.6   Literature Review. 
Kenya has a remarkable dearth of academic commentary in this area and Thiankolu remarks as 
such in his exposition of the challenges faced in the Kenyan legal system due to the lack of 
regulation of modern assisted reproductive technologies.27  
While the constitution is clear that life begins at conception it is interesting to observe how any 
legislative framework will work around this while still maintaining the necessary level of 
pragmatism needed to accommodate assisted reproductive technologies.28 The balance 
between this and procreative liberty as in Murillo v Costa Rica will also be worth noting.29  
The issue of embryos and their legal and moral status has been the subject of a wealth of 
literature and jurisprudence. As a matter of introduction to the field, Kindregan presents a 
palatable discussion on the often-technical subject of assisted reproductive technologies.30 
Tauer discusses the concept of personhood and this substantiates the important link between 
                                                           
27 Thiankolu M, Towards a legal framework on assisted human reproduction technologies in kenya, 2007, Kenya 
Law, 1. 
28 Article 26 (2), Constitution of Kenya, (2010). 
29 Artavia Murillo et al. (“in vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica. 
30 Kindregan PC, ‘The current state of assisted reproduction law’, 10. 
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personhood and life beginning at conception .31 Dickens and Cook discuss the ethical issues in 
reproductive health especially regarding the legal status of in vitro embryos.32 The authors 
discuss the embryo as property, which is important since property is linked to the concept of 
ownership which in turn justifies the right to destroy.33 Perhaps most importantly, they also 
distinguish between judicial approaches to stored embryos which is often pragmatic and 
legislative approaches which tend to reflect a sort of moral or religious ordering. Robertson 
discusses the larger issue of strategies for the disposition of embryos and this is important in 
understanding the greater problems around enforcement of agreements on what to do with 
excess embryos.34 Dolgin35, Carbone and Cahn36 discuss the biology, ideology and politics 
surrounding the embryo conversation particularly in the United States. Katz also investigates 
the legal status of the embryo with an exposition on the different views on the moral status of 
embryos.37  
Affording an embryo “personhood” implies possession of intrinsic rights that do not depend 
on the progenitor’s relationship with the embryo.38 In this instance the embryo is very much 
like a child and issues arising include custody and its best interests.39  
However, regarding embryo as property brings about the bundle of rights conception by 
Hohfeld that sees property not as things but as legal relationships with regard to the subject.40 
In this instance, focus shifts from intrinsic embryo rights to progenitor rights such as control 
under a contractual framework.41  
                                                           
31 Tauer C, ‘Personhood and human embryos and fetuses’, (1985), 253. 
32 Dickens MB, Cook R, ‘Ethical issues arising from the use of assisted reproductive technologies’ 66 
International Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, (1999), 55.  
33 Strahilevitz LJ, ‘The right to destroy’, Yale Law Journal, (2005), 781, 854. 
34 Robertson JA, Precommitment strategies for disposition of frozen embryos, 989. 
35 Dolgin J, ‘Surrounding embryos: biology, ideology, and politics’, 27. 
36 Carbone J, Cahn N, Embryo fundamentalism, 1015.  
37 Katz K, ‘Legal status of the ex utero embryo: implications for adoption law’, 35 Capital University Law 
Review,(2006), 303. 
38 Parsi K, Metaphorical imagination: the moral and legal status of fetuses and embryos, 2 DePaul Journal of 
Health Care Law, (1997), 703. 
39 Berg JW, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 162. 
40 Hohfeld WN, Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning, 26 The Yale Law Journal, (1917), 
710-770. 
41 Berg JW, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 162. 
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1.7   Theoretical Framework. 
Our Constitution expressly states that life begins at conception. This is the starting point in 
considering all jurisprudential debates. 
In the analysis of the personhood movement, this study relies on the natural law concept of 
natural capacities. Lee and George posit that human embryos from conception onward possess 
the ability and potential to develop into a full human being.42 As such, the rights accruing to an 
adult, particularly the right to life, similarly accrues to this embryo. In Embryo: A Defence of 
Human Life, George similarly argues that life begins at conception but from a distinctly 
scientific angle.43 Together with Tollefsen, he argues that a human’s developmental 
programme begins at conception and so does personhood. 
As per George, different rights have different weight and accrue at different times. The right to 
vote for example varies with maturity, ability and other factors. Nevertheless, the right to life 
is not subject to these variations. Instead, it belongs to a human being by virtue of his existence. 
This right to life accrues to every living human being regardless of his state (either born or 
unborn). It is therefore inconsequential that embryos or foetuses do not have the same mental 
acuity as actual persons. All that is important is that they possess the potentiality to develop 
that mental function. 
The premise of opposition to this viewpoint is rather nuanced. Naturalists like George argue 
that life begins at conception and the drafters of our Constitution agree. However, as mentioned 
earlier, this study will also be informed by the property approach.  
As will be discussed later, property describes a bundle of rights in relation to the subject matter 
of application of property theories. In Ownership, Honore discusses the value of the concept 
of ownership to human society and continues to describe essential attributes of the same.44 
Relevant to our purposes in considering disposal of frozen embryos is the right to have 
exclusive physical control of a thing being the right to possession and use of the subject. This 
is related to another right in the bundle that allows the owner to exclude all others from the use 
of the subject. Additional rights include the right to transfer the interests or rights in the subject 
                                                           
42 Lee P, George R, "The Wrong of Abortion”, Blackwell Publishers, New York, 2005. 
43 George R, Tollefsen C, Embryo: A Defence of Human Life¸ Doubleday, 2008. 
44 Honoré AM, Ownership, in Guest AG (ed), Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence, (1961), 107. 
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to others and immunity from expropriation meaning that transfer must be mutually consensual 
save for a few circumstances like eminent domain or bankruptcy.  
Importantly, the right to capital is also included in this bundle and “consists in the power to 
alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of it”.  
An outlier group of opponents to the personhood proposition advance the symmetrical view of 
humanness.45 This is a basic extrapolation of the occurrence of death on the cessation of brain 
activity which has general consensus.46 This theory reasons that if life ends when the brain 
“dies”, it is not unreasonable to extend the same argument to when it begins. Therefore, life 
begins when brain activity is evident. As with many scientific concepts, there is no agreed 
criteria of determining when this activity can be detected but if we choose to rely on 
electroencephalographic waves, this could be between eight and ten weeks after fertilization.47 
Before this period, the organism exhibits uncoordinated activity that is only synchronised on 
the emergence of the brain.48 
As a result, however we treat the organism in in vitro fertilization or indeed in other procedures 
is contingent on the singular event of brain function. 
1.8   Hypothesis. 
1. Kenya should adopt a balanced interpretation of the right to life and reproductive rights. 
1.9   Research Design and Methodology. 
The method to be used in collecting information for this paper will mainly be qualitative 
research. This will be a combination of library research and internet searches on books, journal 
articles and research papers. Library research will be important in analysing jurisprudential 
debate around personhood. On the other hand, internet searches will be vital in analysing 
                                                           
45 See Goldenring JM, The brain-life theory: towards a consistent biological definition of humanness, 11, Journal 
of Medical Ethics, (1985), 198-204, Shea M, embryonic life and human life, 11, Journal of Medical Ethics, 
(1985),205-209. 
46 The National Health Service in the United Kingdom for example, establishment of death is only on the 
establishment of brain death. Once brain death is established, the body is removed from life support, if any. See 
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/brain-death/Pages/Introduction.aspx  on 21st March 2016. 
47 This is the measurement of brain activity. See http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/eeg/pages/introduction.aspx on 
21st March 2016. 
48 Goldenring JM, The brain-life theory: towards a consistent biological definition of humanness, 200. 
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different interpretations by different scholars on this sensitive issue. It will also be important 
to investigate how different jurisdictions have approached the issue.  
Lastly, internet searches will also be necessary in analysing case law from other jurisdictions. 
1.10 Limitations. 
This study is limited by time constraints. 
It is also limited by the research design and methodology that does not incorporate fieldwork 
and will therefore rely on qualitative analysis 
1.11 Chapter Breakdown. 
1.11.1 Chapter One 
This chapter provides a background to the study that serves as the introduction. It also contains 
the statement of the problem, objectives and research questions. Finally, it contains the 
literature review, conceptual framework, and hypothesis and research design of the study. 
1.11.2 Chapter Two 
This chapter will carry out a jurisprudential analysis around personhood, it origin in philosophy 
and its proponents. It will also include contrarian views to the same. 
1.11.3 Chapter Three 
This chapter will carry out a comparative analysis of judicial and legislative approaches to the 
disposal of embryos in other jurisdictions. 
1.11.4 Chapter Four 
This chapter will frame the general practice of in vitro fertilization into the framework on 
reproductive health. 
1.11.5 Chapter Five 
This chapter will review the findings and make a determination on the legal effect of the 







Chapter Two- End of April 2016 
Chapter Three-End of April 2016. 
Chapter Four- End of May 2016. 




CHAPTER TWO; PERSONS OR PROPERTY? 
2.1   Introduction  
The law can easily be summed as a profession of words meaning that the life of the law and its 
manifestation into positive form relies on the linguistic construction of the relevant matter. For 
this very reason, there are two predominant frameworks of analysing the legal status of 
embryos being either the “embryo as person” framework or “embryo as property” framework. 
Affording an embryo “personhood” implies possession of intrinsic rights that do not depend 
on the progenitor’s relationship with the embryo.49 In this instance the embryo is very much 
like a child and issues arising include custody and its best interests.50 Under this lens, any 
detrimental action to the embryo, such as voluntary disposal, would engender liability under 
criminal law such as abortion.51 In extreme cases, such as in El Salvador, convictions for 
aggravated homicide have been obtained on women following miscarriages under a 
personhood framework.52 
On the flipside, regarding embryo as property reignites the Hohfeldian bundle of rights 
conception that sees property not as things but as legal relationships with regard to the subject.53 
In this instance, focus shifts from intrinsic embryo rights to progenitor rights such as control 
under a contractual framework.54 Under the property framework, voluntary disposal of 
cryopreserved embryo would not lead to any criminal or even tortious liability for assault since 
it would be covered by the bundle under the right to destroy.55  
The above conceptions are not abstract in nature and remain extremely relevant in a variety of 
legal fields. Issues such as conveyance of frozen embryos acquire greater significance if viewed 
through these contrasting frameworks. For example, if persons, any transfer of embryos would 
                                                           
49 Parsi K, Metaphorical imagination: the moral and legal status of fetuses and embryos, 703. 
50 Berg JW, Owning persons: the application of property theory to embryos and fetuses, 162. 
51 Guzman KR, Property, progeny, body part: assisted reproduction and the transfer of wealth, 31 University of 
California, Davis Law Review, (1997), 193. 
52 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/el-salvador-and-las-17/ On 7th November, 2016. 
See also http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/opinion/el-salvador-and-las-17.html On 7th November, 2016. 
53 Hohfeld WN, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning, 710-770. 
54 Berg JW, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 162.  




be rightfully restricted since trade in humans is not permissible. Such issues would not be 
pertinent in a property framework simply because the embryos can be owned. 
This chapter will therefore dissect the two frameworks which derive legitimacy under natural 
law (person) or labor and occupation theories (property) in order to provide a basis for analysis 
of the legal issues under study. 
2.2   Embryos as Property  
This discussion analyses whether and when property theories that explain the application of 
private property rights can be contextually applied in the case of frozen embryos and will form 
the basis of an eventual conclusion on the propriety of the same.56 
Sprankling describes property as rights among people that concern things.57 Property therefore 
describes rights and interests in a thing in relation to others. Natural aversion that may arise 
due to reference to potential human life as “thing” or “property” should be overcome by the 
fact property theory does not focus on the subject of application. Instead, it considers the 
interests in the said subject that define application of property theories. 
As discussed earlier, property describes a bundle of rights in relation to the subject matter of 
application of property theories and constitutes ownership. In Ownership, Honore discusses 
the value of the concept of ownership to human society and continues to describe essential 
attributes of the same.58 Relevant to our purposes in considering disposal of frozen embryos is 
the right to have exclusive physical control of a thing being the right to possession and use of 
the subject. This is related to another right in the bundle that allows the owner to exclude all 
others from the use of the subject. Additional rights include the right to transfer the interests or 
rights in the subject to others and immunity from seizure meaning that transfer must be 
mutually consensual save for a few circumstances like eminent domain or bankruptcy.  
Importantly, the right to capital is also included in this bundle and “consists in the power to 
alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of it”. While 
                                                           
56 Berg JW, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 170. 
57 Sprankling JG, Understanding Property Law, LexisNexis, 2007, 2.  
58 Honoré AM, Ownership, in Guest AG (ed), Oxford, 107. 
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this will be discussed later in this work, interesting jurisprudence such as in Davis v Davis59 
regards the right to destroy frozen embryos as part of procreative liberty. 
What follows is an analytical breakdown of property theories that explain property rights. 
2.2.1 Natural Rights 
According to Aristotle, the right to property is inherent in the moral order and should be 
encouraged so that man can tend to his own affairs rather than meddle in others.60 On the other 
hand, the related labour based theories argue that rights arise in nature, and are not dependent 
on government.61 This implies that the work of government is to enforce natural law that exists 
in nature which is in direct opposition to positivism that posits that property rights exist only 
to the extent that the legal system recognizes them. According to Locke, these property rights 
arise out of man’s “labour and work of his hands” in adding value to anything that he removed 
from the state of nature. This is justified by the necessity to sustain free individuals.  
Importantly according to Locke, man had a right to property not only to the products of his 
labour but in his or her own body.62 Using this formulation therefore, embryos would be 
property since it is constituted of products belonging to the progenitor (gametes.) 
A limitation that is evident in this conception is therefore whether children, being the “product” 
of procreation would also be classified as property.63 This would of course go against inherent 
human sensibilities against commoditization of persons. Furthermore, Margaret Radin 
criticises the notion that this theory is justified by the necessity to sustain and produce free 
individuals since it implies that any form of property inconsistent with people who are not free 
is not justified.64 
2.2.2 Utilitarian Theory  
Classic utilitarianism is seen through the pioneering works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mills and focuses on maximizing the greatest good for the greatest number. Applied to property 
                                                           
59 Discussed in Strahilevitz LJ, The right to destroy, 781. 
60 Bell A, Parchomovsky G, A theory of property, 90 Cornell Law Review, (2005), 542. 
61 Sprankling JG, Understanding Property Law,2. 
62 http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/is-the-body-property on 7th November, 2016. 
63 Berg JW, Owning persons: the application of property theory to embryos and fetuses, 182. 
64 Radin M, Property and Personhood, 34 Stanford Law Review, 1982, 979. 
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theory, it supports property as a means to achieving social wealth.65 Benthamite writings are 
deeply critical of natural theories and so it is no surprise that he dismisses that conception above 
and goes ahead to state that;  
“Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made, there 
was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.”66 
The law and economics approach has been adopted by scholars in order to incorporate 
economic theory into utilitarian theory and through it, some have analysed of property rights 
in children and body organs though not necessarily frozen embryos. Richard Posner, who 
defines property as rights to the exclusive use of valuable resources, has advanced some 
intellectually sound but fairly controversial ideas bridging reproduction with economic 
efficiency.67 In "The Economics of the Baby Shortage” Landes and Posner argue for a free 
market in babies in the adoption process meaning in essence permitting agencies to sell children 
to the highest bidder.68 Other scholars have argued for the right to commercially exploit body 
organs for sale.69 In Moore v. the Regents of the University of California, the Court of Appeals 
in California held that; 
The rights of dominion over one's body, and the interests one has therein, are recognized 
in many cases. These rights and interests are so akin to property interest that it would 
be subterfuge to call them anything else.70 
The problem with this conception is that it is dangerously blind to disinclinations people have 
to relegating the human body to a purely academic and economic variable. This leads to a 
disproportionate focus on the human body as property in its colloquial meaning as opposed to 
a focus on the interests in the body that is more palatable. Commodification of the human body 
is not an easily acceptable concept and immediately generates revulsion not just in the 
                                                           
65 Berg JW, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 176. 
66 Sprankling JG, Understanding Property Law,16;  
 
68 See Landes EM, Posner R, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 2 The Journal of Legal Studies, (1978), 323-
348. 
69 Hardiman R, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of 
Human Tissue, 34 University of California Law Review, (1986). 
70 Dorney MS, Moore v. the Regents of the University of California: Balancing the need for biotechnology 
innovation against the right of informed consent, 5 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, (1990), 342.  
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particular case it is being considered but due to the fear that it may “open the door to an array 
of terrible distributive consequences.”71  
Radin explored the problem of universal commodification in cases where our system of 
traditional liberalism considers some rights to be inalienable and nonsalable but is faced by the 
concept of “negative liberty” which essentially provides for the right to be left alone as long as 
one does not interfere with the rights of others.72 Laws establishing non-transferability due to 
legal or moral rules are considered to be paternalistic meaning that authority is justified to exert 
coercion to guide individuals to their good.73 Opponents of this would argue that this position 
interferes with personal liberty, freedom and choice.74 Radin contends that this is inconsistent 
with the notion that the concept of freedom necessarily requires that some individual rights 
should not be commodified.75 
To solve this, Radin suggests that certain personal aspects should be alienable but this does not 
extend to extremely intimate aspects.76 According to Radin, this would justify allowing 
prostitution, surrogacy and baby selling so long as limits are put in place to reduce negative 
effects to aspects of personhood.  
 
2.2.3 Personality Theories 
Personality theories justify private property as essential to the full development of the 
individual.77 Georg Hegel, who pioneered this field argued that the institution of private 
property is central to freedom and through it, an individual becomes a person.78 
Professor Radin is the preeminent scholar on modern personality theories through her work in 
Property and Personhood. After considering various theories of the person including Kantian 
                                                           
71 Render M, The Law of the Body,62 Emory Law Journal, (2013), 5. 
72 Radin M, Market Inalienability, 100 Harvard Law Review, (1987) 1849. 
73 Radin M, Market Inalienability,1899. 
74 Radin M, Market Inalienability,1899. 
75 Radin M, Market Inalienability, 1903. 
76 Radin M, Market Inalienability,1907-1914. 
77 Sprankling JG, Understanding Property Law, 21. 
78 Berg JW, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 183. 
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and Lockean personalities79, she describes her “theoretical opposites”. One such opposite is 
property that is so intimately connected to a person so much so that its loss cannot be relieved 
by its replacement while the other category is property that is held purely as a means to an end 
and is replaceable with other goods of equal market value.80 Radin calls the former personal 
property and the latter fungible property and according to her, personal property should be 
given greater protection.81 In this conceptualization therefore, property rights in the embryo are 














                                                           
79 For Kant, The person is a free and rational agent whose existence is an end in itself while for Locke, The person 
is a thinking intelligent being with reason and reflection and can consider as itself the same thing in different times 
and places. See Radin M, Property and Personhood,962-963. 
80 Radin M, Property and Personhood, 960. 
81 Radin M, Property and Personhood, 960. 
82 Berg JW, Owning persons: the application of property theory to embryos and fetuses, 185. 
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2.3  Personhood Theory 
There are divergent views on the meaning of the word “person” articulated by different writers. 
Legally speaking, it describes those entities entitled to constitutional protection and individual 
rights especially the right to life due to the mere fact of existence.83 This position considers 
embryos as full human persons deserving of a similar moral status and the accompanying rights 
that living persons possess. The natural law concept of natural capacities discussed by Lee and 
George posit that human embryos from conception onward possess the ability and potential to 
develop into a full human being.84 As such, the rights accruing to an adult, particularly the right 
to life, similarly accrues to this embryo. In Embryo: A Defence of Human Life, George echoes 
our Constitution and argues that life begins at conception. 85 Together with Tollefsen, he argues 
that a human’s development begins at conception and therefore so does personhood. However, 
different rights have different weight and accrue at different times. The right to vote for 
example varies with maturity, ability and other factors. Nevertheless, the right to life is not 
subject to these variations. Instead, it belongs to a human being by virtue of his existence. This 
right to life accrues to every living human being regardless of his state (either born or unborn). 
It is therefore inconsequential that embryos or foetuses do not have the same mental acuity as 
actual persons. All that is important is that they possess the potentiality to develop that mental 
function. 
As discussed earlier, ascribing embryos the right to life has significant legal consequences as 
far as the progenitors or even the doctors involved are concerned. Seeing as the embryo is very 
much a child, ownership cannot be conferred on any individual and issues arising include 
custody and its best interests. Harming the embryo for example would therefore be tantamount 
to abortion, homicide or manslaughter. A claim under the tort of assault would also be justified 
under this conception.86 Fertility centres that refuse to render back possession of the embryos 
to the rightful parents (not owners) would be liable for a claim for kidnapping.87 This also has 
                                                           
83http://rewire.news/article/2013/01/03/fetal-personhood-laws-juridical-persons-are-not-natural-persons-and-
why-it-matter/ on 7th November, 2016. 
84 Lee P, George R, "The Wrong of Abortion”, 15. 
85 George R, Tollefsen C, Embryo: A Defence of Human Life¸ Doubleday, 2008, 59. 
86 See Guzman KR, Property, progeny, body part: assisted reproduction and the transfer of wealth, 205-206. 
87 Embryo-napping as it were. See Guzman KR, Property, progeny, body part: assisted reproduction and the 
transfer of wealth, 205. 
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significant effects on property ownership and transfer especially in succession issues since if 
the embryos is a person, then it can very well own property. 
2.4  Conclusion  
This chapter has traced the conflicting property and person frameworks in discussions on 
embryos. Seeing as Kenya has chosen to adopt the latter, it also a demonstration of the legal 
effect of the choice to adopt a personhood conception. 
The best and most succinct summary is as follows; “if a person, the embryo can own property; 














                                                           
88 Guzman KR, Property, progeny, body part: assisted reproduction and the transfer of wealth, 205-206. 
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CHAPTER THREE; COMPARATIVE STUDY 
3.1  Introduction  
It has been previously observed in this thesis that Kenya has clearly adopted a personhood 
approach through Article 26(2) of the Constitution.89 This chapter therefore looks at different 
interpretations regarding the treatment of embryos with the aim of demonstrating the potential 
effects that our chosen approach will have on legislation on assisted reproductive technologies.  
It will look at case studies in El Salvador and Costa Rica where seemingly extreme 
interpretations of personhood provisions have resulted in potentially absurd outcomes.  
The chapter will also analyse the United States’ position on the moral and legal status of the 
embryo as well as reproductive rights in general.  
3.2  Costa Rica and El Salvador 
The selection of these two jurisdictions is based on the interpretation of personhood provisions 
in their constitutive documents. 
In Costa Rica’s case, the Inter American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) demonstrated 
tempered judgement and a careful balancing of rights while considering a case involving a ban 
on in vitro fertilization (IVF).  
The opposite is true in El Salvador’s case where the courts have adopted an extremist and 
decidedly absurd interpretation of its personhood conception of the rights of the unborn.  
3.2.1 Costa Rica 
Similar to our Article 26(2) of our Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights, 
that Costa Rica is party to, provides in Article 4(1) that “Every person has the right to have his 
life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of 
conception.” 90   
In Article 11(2), the Convention also provides for the right of privacy by stating that persons 
shall not be subjected to abusive interference in private life. Finally, Article 17 protects the 
right to start a family. 
                                                           
89 Constitution of Kenya, (2010). 
90 Article 4(1), American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123. 
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All these rights were under contention when brought before the IACtHR in Artavia Murillo et 
al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica.91   
In the year 1995, the Costa Rican Ministry of Health issued regulations aimed at mainstreaming 
the emerging technology of in vitro fertilization.92 Soon after, the decree was challenged on the 
basis that IVF and its procedures, including embryo disposal, contradicted right to life 
provisions in the Costa Rican Constitution and in the American Convention on Human Rights. 
In endorsing this challenge, the Costa Rican highest court stated that indeed life begins at 
conception and therefore any dealing with embryos is inconsistent with the “life and dignity of 
a human being.”93  
This decision spawned numerous tales of heartbreak, hardship and despair from couples who 
faced insurmountable obstacles to achievement of their right to start a family due to problems 
with fertility.94  For many of them, IVF offered the only chance at successful conception and 
the judgement now effectively condemned them to childlessness.95  
Against this backdrop, aggrieved couples filed a petition with the Inter American Commission 
on Human Rights who subsequently made recommendations to the state to lift the ban on IVF 
and make reparations to the victims.96 Costa Rica’s reluctance to meet their obligations pushed 
the Commission to present their case before the IACtHR on the basis of violations of the above 
mentioned rights. 
In a rejection of the state’s objections, the Court ruled that the ban violated the victims’ rights 
including rights to personal integrity, privacy, access to reproductive services and the right to 
start a family.97 
                                                           
91 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 224-244. 
92 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 22. 
93 Peterson C, Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 38 Loyola of Los Angeles International 
and Comparative Law Review, (2016), 1348. 
94 See Peterson C, Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 1346-1354 for a detailed 
explanation of the travails of each couple. 
95 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 28. 
96 Gretel Artavia Murillo Et Al. (In Vitro Fertilization) v Costa Rica, IACmHR Case 12.361 (2010), 30. 
97 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 93. 
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Further the Court gave an interesting interpretation of “conception”. Taking into account 
contrasting views of when conception occurs (fertilization98 versus implantation99), the court 
declined to treat conception as an occurrence independent of the female body without which 
the embryo’s chance of survival would be obviously be significantly reduced. Instead, it 
regarded conception to have occurred only when implantation would have taken place and as 
such, ousted the jurisdiction of Article 4(1) of the Convention.100 In any case, the court 
concluded that the phrase “in general” implied that the article was not intended for absolute 
application.101  
Additionally, the limitation of the above mentioned rights through a total ban of IVF was ruled 
not to be justifiable in an open and democratic society since it constituted discrimination of 
those who could not achieve natural conception.102  
Considering that the risk of losing the embryo in assisted reproductive technologies such as 
IVF also persists in normal conceptions, the court found that the ban was disproportionately 
interfering in private life by giving absolute protection to the embryo.103 
In its final and binding judgement, the Court ordered the unconditional lifting of the ban and 
compensation to the plaintiffs. 
This is therefore the law in all 22 countries that have ratified the Convention. 
3.2.2 El Salvador 
The El Salvador illustration shows the possibility of an extremely narrow interpretation of 
personhood provisions. While it does not specifically apply to IVF procedures, it is necessary 
to show that judicial interpretations can vary wildly. The Salvadorian constitution clearly states 
that life begins at conception.104 Coupled with absolute prohibition on abortion, the country 
maintains restrictive provisions on reproductive rights. While the morality or otherwise of 
abortion is certainly a hot button issue that this thesis would not like to litigate, the reality is 
                                                           
98 As decided by the Supreme Court in Costa Rica.  
99 Fertilization describes the fusion between the male and female gametes while implantation describes the 
attachment of the result of fertilization on the uterine walls. In IVF, fertilization occurs outside the womb. 
100 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 57. 
101 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 78; refers to the phrase “Every person has the 
right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of 
conception.” 
102 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 93. 
103 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 93. 
104 Article 1, Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador, (1983). 
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that strict application of the rules on personhood and abortion has led to manifestly unjust 
outcomes. Amnesty International details cases in which women suffering miscarriages or any 
other pre-natal complications that result in premature termination of the pregnancy are 
prosecuted for aggravated homicide on the constitutional basis that life begins at conception.105 
This unjust result is justified by the narrow interpretation of the “life begins at conception” 
constitutional provision and goes to demonstrate that debates about personhood are not abstract 
classroom simulations as they influence judicial opinion which inevitably impacts women’s 
rights. 
3.3   United States 
Any discussion on prenatal personhood in the United States inevitably begins with Harry 
Blackmun’s opinion in the seminal case, Roe v Wade where he restated the fact that the law 
has not endorsed any formulation that accrues legal personality to the unborn.  
In his own words, “…the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole 
sense.” 106   
The United States therefore does not accord any rights to the unborn and this partly explains 
why litigation on cryopreserved embryos has been as part of other disputes such as divorce. 
The latest data indicates that there may be up to six hundred thousand cryopreserved embryos 
in the United States.107 Further statistics on in vitro fertilization in the United States show that 
97% of IVF clinics are willing to proceed with cryopreservation methods for extra embryos 
and out of these 84% are open to disposal of the embryos.108  
The very first case to address issues of personhood in relation to in vitro fertilization in the 
United States was Davis v Davis.109 In this case, the two litigants had completed divorce 
proceedings but could not agree on what to do with their frozen embryos. The (former) husband 
                                                           
105 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/el-salvador-and-las-17/ on 23rd January 2016. In each of 
these cases, the small issue of intention is deemed irrelevant.  
106 Roe v Wade (1973), The Supreme Court of the United States. 
107 http://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa-and-initiatives/embryo-adoption/ on 23rd November 2016. 
Some have referred to this situation as an “embryo glut”; http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-
ice-americas-embryo-glut-and-wasted-promise-stem-cell-research on 23rd November 2016. 
108 Gurmankin AD, Sisti D, Caplan AL, Embryo disposal practices in IVF clinics in the United States, 22 Politics 
And The Life Sciences (2004), 2. 
109 Davis v. Davis, (1992), Supreme Court of Tennessee, United States. 
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wanted them destroyed while the (former) wife wanted them donated to another couple. In its 
decision, the court affirmed the position in Roe that personhood does not accrue to the unborn 
until live birth. The court also commented on the persons or property dichotomy and decided 
that embryos cannot be persons whether under state or federal law.110  
Interestingly, the court also declined to assign property status to the embryos and instead ruled 
that they “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.”111 This position was later rejected in Kass v Kass which asserted that 
progenitors in fact have a bundle of rights in their frozen embryos.112 
Just as in Kenya and other developing countries, the law in the United States is largely behind 
the science meaning that disputes on frozen embryos remain unresolved by precedent. An 
example of this is the ongoing high profile dispute between actress Sofia Vergara and her 
former partner, Nick Loeb over two frozen embryos.113 Vergara wishes to freeze the embryos 
indefinitely while Loeb argues that this goes against his religious sensibilities and would like 
to carry the embryos to term via a surrogate. The dispute hinges on whether the court will agree 
to uphold a contract between the two that requires mutual consent in any dealing with the 
embryos. This shows that normal contractual certainty is absent in the field of assisted 
reproductive technologies since courts may refuse to uphold the agreements. 
This fact that some jurisdictions may refuse to uphold advance agreements further complicates 
the issue of dealing with cryopreserved embryos. As a matter of precaution, parties may enter 
into agreements such as consent forms or contracts to determine what to do with the embryos 
on the occurrence of an event such as a divorce or even death.114 Despite arguments that these 
agreements promote certainty and prevent unwanted parenthood as well as promote 
reproductive freedom115, some courts have nevertheless refused to enforce these agreements.116 
                                                           
110 Davis v. Davis, (1992), Supreme Court of Tennessee, United States. 
111 Davis v. Davis, (1992), Supreme Court of Tennessee, United States. 
112 Kass v. Kass, (1998) Court Of Appeals of New York, United States. 
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114 Robertson JA, Precommitment strategies for disposition of frozen embryos, 20. 
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In A.Z v B.Z, the Court rejected an attempt to enforce a consent form signed by both parties 
that would have resolved the dispute between the parties on what to do with frozen embryos.117 
While pre-commitment strategies like contractual agreements may be useful in resolving 
disputes over frozen embryos, including their disposal, it is apparent that this legal gap throws 
the constitutionality of these agreements into uncertainty. As a simple matter of contract law, 
it is unclear why courts would subvert the will of parties simply because one party had a change 
of mind.  
In conclusion, it is readily observable that since Roe, there have been state-wide efforts aimed 
at incorporating personhood provisions into state constitutions despite the clarity in the United 
States Constitution on rights accruing at birth 118 These efforts are usually done through popular 
initiatives like referenda although federal amendments introducing sanctity of human life have 
also been proposed extending rights to the unborn.119  
However, these efforts have largely failed due to concerns on the status of in vitro fertilization 
as well as pregnant women who suffer miscarriages or some other complication just as has 
been observed in the El Salvador case study detailed above.  
The strength of the precedent set in Roe which has survived numerous challenges in the forty 
three years since it was pronounced also serves as a significant obstacle to these campaigns.  
3.4   Conclusion  
The United States shows that despite the strides in technology in the IVF industry, it is still 
nascent and more will need to be done to increase certainty and resolve some of the pertinent 
issues. 
Costa Rica demonstrates a situation where the courts exercised judicial power wisely and 
achieved a just outcome. Such an interpretation is needed to balance the latent public policy 
interest in protecting life against the imperative of protecting reproductive justice. After all, the 
European Court on Human Rights has ruled that if the unborn has a right to life, this right is 
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not absolute and is in fact limited by the mother’s rights and interests.120 It also demonstrates 
that our judicial approach to interpreting Article 26(2) on the right to life need not be 
excessively restrictive. 
El Salvador represents the potential danger of a restrictive interpretation on the wellbeing of 
women who are innocent by any stretch of the imagination. Manifestly unjust outcomes such 
as the one witnessed in the cases detailed above should as much as possible be avoided as they 
unfairly discriminate women’s rights and personal dignity. 
In conclusion, one of Blackmun J’s most iconic statements comes in Roe when he states that;  
“We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in 
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at 
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is 
not in a position to speculate as to the answer.” 121 
This is not an implicit abdication of the duties that bind judicial officers, it is merely a 
demonstration of the inherent difficulties of resolving issues to do with life. It is also an 
acknowledgment of the futility of getting bogged down in debates and culture wars about the 
moral, philosophical and religious status of the embryo especially in pluralist societies.  
The law and by extension the judiciary should therefore attempt to negotiate an acceptable 
middle ground that respects the sanctity of life without unduly restricting personal rights. 
  
                                                           
120 Vo v. France, ECtHR Judgement of 8 July 2004, 80. 
121 Roe v Wade (1973), The Supreme Court of the United States. 
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CHAPTER FOUR; IN VITRO FERTILIZATION IN KENYA AND 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS  
4.1   Introduction  
This chapter will attempt to investigate the development of the practice in the country as well 
as how it fits into the right to reproductive healthcare.  
It will involve an investigation into Kenyan international and local commitments regarding 
reproductive rights.  
4.2   In vitro fertilization in Kenya 
As earlier observed, the in vitro fertilization Industry in Kenya is still in its embryonic stages 
and unsurprisingly, there is little by way of statistics on the practice in the country.122 The fact 
that there is only one in vitro fertilization (hereafter IVF) clinic in Nairobi further demonstrates 
this point.123   
However, available information from the Nairobi IVF Centre indicates that the practice is 
slowly gaining traction in the country. In its first three years, the clinic performed three hundred 
and sixty two (362) treatment cycles for over three hundred (300) couples.124 Similar to the 
cases reported in the Murillo Case, these couples suffered a variety of issues that restricted 
their ability to perform one of the most basic and sacred human functions. A variety of factors 
contributed to this infertility ranging from blocked tubes and uterine disorders for the ladies to 
low sperm count for the men.125  
Overall, female factors made up for about 58% of the causative issues while male factors made 
up for 31.4% of the reported cases.126 
                                                           
122 See note 26 above.  
123 The Nairobi IVF Centre. 
124 Noreh LJ, Tucs O, Sekadde-Kigondu CB, Noreh LJ, Outcomes of assisted reproductive technologies at the 
Nairobi in vitro fertilisation centre, 86 East African Medical Journal, 159. 
125 Noreh LJ, Tucs O, Sekadde-Kigondu CB, Noreh LJ, Outcomes of assisted reproductive technologies at the 
Nairobi in vitro fertilisation centre,158. 
126 Noreh LJ, Tucs O, Sekadde-Kigondu CB, Noreh LJ, Outcomes of assisted reproductive technologies at the 
Nairobi in vitro fertilisation centre, 159. 
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The clinic also reported a pregnancy rate of 28.9% which seems modest but compares well to 
the average in the United Kingdom of 20% at the time of reporting.127 
4.3   Review of the In Vitro Fertilization Bill (2014) 
The In Vitro Fertilization Bill (2014) was introduced in the National Assembly by the Member 
of Parliament for Mbita, Hon. (Ms.) Odhiambo-Mabona.128 Currently at the Second Reading 
stage, the Bill enjoys strong bipartisan support by members of all faiths who see it as a way to 
alleviate the suffering of couples unable to conceive. However, it has encountered opposition 
from members of the Departmental Committee on Heath who argue that the issue has been 
sufficiently covered in the Health Bill (2015) and therefore, there is no need for a standalone 
Act.129  
The stated purpose of the Bill is to pass legislation for the “regulation of In vitro fertilization, 
to prohibit certain practices in connection with in-vitro fertilization, to establish an in-vitro 
fertilization Authority; to make provision in relation to children born of in-vitro fertilization 
process and for connected purposes.”130 The Bill justifies state intervention in private matters 
by asserting that it has legitimate interest in regulating matters that may have negative impacts 
on society and to protect individuals from any adverse impacts due to the application of new 
technology.131 Additionally, the fact that third parties like fertility clinics are involved moves 
the practice to the public sphere.132 
4.3.1 Summary of the Bill 
4.3.1.1 Part I 
This part contains preliminary provisions including the preamble and definition of terms used 
in the Bill. Clause 3 of the Bill provides that the Bill shall apply to any process of fertilization 
that takes place outside the human body.133 
                                                           
127 Noreh LJ, Tucs O, Sekadde-Kigondu CB, Noreh LJ, Outcomes of assisted reproductive technologies at the 
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129 See note 23 above. 
130 Preamble, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
131 Memorandum of Objects and Reasons, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
132 See above. 
133 Clause 3, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
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4.3.1.2 Part II 
Under this part, the Bill aims to establish the In-Vitro Fertilization Authority.134 The authority 
is tasked with developing guidelines on the practice including on the treatment of embryos and 
providing general supervision of in vitro fertilization clinics among other functions.135 It further 
provides for the composition of the Board that will manage the Authority.136 
4.3.1.3 Part III 
In this section, the Bill provides for activities that are prohibited in the practice of IVF. This 
includes using the embryo in any manner apart from that provided in the Bill137 using any 
reproductive material from a donor without written consent, 138 undertaking IVF for any other 
purpose apart from reproduction such as for experimental purposes139 among other practices.  
Importantly, before commencing IVF, a doctor is supposed to certify that person wishing to 
undertake IVF, is unable to conceive naturally due to factors related to age or lifestyle.140 
The aim of this part is to restrict IVF to purely procreational purposes in order to avoid use of 
embryo tissue in research or some other controversial manner that is yet to be discussed by 
Parliament. This addresses any possible reservations by people who ascribe to the point of view 
that life is sacred and should not be interfered with arbitrarily. 
4.3.1.4 Part IV 
This part provides for the rights of parents, donors and children. It addresses key legal issues 
on who is a mother under a surrogate motherhood agreement and who is a “father” in instances 
where insemination has occurred in a woman married to the man or in a surrogate 
arrangement.141  It generally deals with the rights that accrue to each party in vitro fertilization 
including the child born out of IVF.142 
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135 Clause 5, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
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141 Clause 28, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
142 Clause 31, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
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4.3.1.5 Part V 
In this Part, the Bill provides that the Authority must maintain a public register in order to allow 
individuals interested in knowing whether or not they were conceived by means of IVF to 
access such information.143 
The Register shall include information on; 
• IVF services provided to persons;  
• Storage or use of gametes of persons or of an embryo;  
• Persons who undergo IVF;  
• Donors of embryos and gametes;  
• Persons conceived in consequence of in-vitro fertilization treatment services. 
4.3.1.6 Part VI 
This part gives the Authority the power to issue or revoke licenses to persons carrying out 
IVF.144 It also prescribes a statutory storage period for embryos as for a period not exceeding 
five years.145 
4.3.1.7 Part VII 
This contains provisions on the financial management of the Authority. 
4.3.1.8 Part VIII 
This provides miscellaneous provision including offences and penalties. 
4.3.1.9 Part IX 
This part provides for delegated powers of the Cabinet Secretary including preparing 
regulations on the number of embryos that may be implanted in a woman. 
4.3.2 Constitutional Concerns 
The main constitutional concern with the Bill is its conformity to Article 26 on the right to life. 
While it is silent on the issue of disposal of embryos, it provides for a maximum statutory 
period for the storage of embryos.146 It is unclear what is to be done with the embryos once the 
statutory period expires and this ambiguity may be interpreted as allowing for the disposal of 
                                                           
143 Clause 35, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
144 Clause 39, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
145 Clause 44, In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
146 Clause 44(1), In Vitro Fertilization Bill, (2014). 
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the same. This of course means that the clause may be declared unconstitutional for being 
inconsistent with Article 26(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, (2010). 
4.4   IVF as Part of Reproductive Freedom 
The Commission on Human Rights through resolution 2003/28 unequivocally stated that States 
have a duty to protect sexual and reproductive health since they are integral elements of the 
right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.147  
During the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 
1994, it was resolved that an essential element of reproductive health is the freedom to decide 
“if, when and how” to reproduce including the right to access health services that will enable 
women to go safely through childbirth and provide couples with the “best chance of having a 
healthy infant.”148 Additionally part of its action plans, governments are encouraged to provide 
appropriate ethical and medical standards for IVF procedures.149 While the Cairo Programme 
for Action is not binding on States, it remains persuasive on both governments and legislators 
and in fact influenced Parliamentary discussions on the In Vitro Fertilization Bill (2014).150 
IVF is therefore very much a part of the regime on the right to reproduce which should be 
formally legislated once the Reproductive Healthcare Bill passes into law.151 The Bill 
interestingly acknowledges IVF when it provides for the right to gestational surrogacy.152  
Nevertheless the Constitution has general provisions that can be purposively interpreted to 
protect the practice of IVF including the right to the highest attainable standard of health and 
access to health care services including reproductive health care.153 
                                                           
147 UNCHR Resolution 2003/28: The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
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In the Murillo Case, it was also conceded that the absolute ban on in vitro fertilization 
constituted an unfair violation of private and family life which it interpreted to include 
reproductive freedom.154 
4.5   International Framework for Reproductive Rights 
The Constitution of Kenya (2010) settled the debate on whether Kenya is a monist or a dualist 
State when in Article 2(6) it stated that any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form 
part of our law. In Article 2(5), it also affirms that the general rules of international law shall 
form part of the law of Kenya.  
By virtue of the above mentioned provisions, Kenya is not only a monist state bound by the 
treaties and conventions it ratifies, it is also bound by rules and norms established as part of 
customary international law.155  
Case law has confirmed this position in In Re The Matter of Zipporah Wambui Mathara where 
the Court declined to commit the applicant to civil jail in enforcement of a debt despite an Act 
of Parliament mandating the opposite.156 The Court held that the ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which legislated against civil 
jail implied that the Covenant is part our law and therefore should have been applied to protect 
the applicant’s rights.157 
Meanwhile, in Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v Attorney General 
and Another the Court ruled that the High Court has universal jurisdiction under Article 2(5) 
to enforce peremptory norms under customary international law.158  
The import of these provisions is that international law which legislates on the right to 
reproductive healthcare has the same force of law as any other legislation so long as they are 
not inconsistent with the Constitution.159 
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4.5.1 International Treaties and Conventions protecting Reproductive Health 
As mentioned above, access to alternative forms of health services that enable safe childbearing 
is an element of reproductive health. This section will therefore indicate different international 
treaties which Kenya is signatory to that mandate the protection of the right to health which 
necessarily includes reproductive health.  
4.5.1.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
Article 25(1) provides that for the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
wellbeing of himself and of his family.160  
4.5.1.2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
In Article 12 of the ICESR, the Covenant provides that States have the duty to recognize the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health.161 General comment 14 of this right by the 
Committee On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights elaborates that the right includes certain 
freedoms and entitlements including sexual and reproductive freedom and equal access to a 
good healthcare system.162 Additionally, Article 15(1) (b) gives the right of all to benefit from 
scientific progress which presumably includes assisted reproductive technologies. 
A provision similar to the Article 12 is found as Article 16 in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights.163 
4.5.1.3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
This Convention adopted in 1979 provides in Article 12 that States shall undertake to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, access to health 
care services, including those related to sexual and reproductive health.164 
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4.4.2  Position of International Human Rights Law on Personhood 
It is of perhaps critical importance to note that the international human rights law regime that 
is entrenched in the Kenyan legal system does not attribute personhood to the embryo in any 
way. In fact, the various human rights treaties, as seen in preparatory documents, have 
deliberately avoided treating the embryo as a child.  
A look at the UDHR reveals an intentional exclusion of the unborn when coming up with the 
first article which states that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.”165 Additionally, during the drafting of the ICCPR, attempts by Lebanon to protect life 
“from the moment of conception” were rejected and the final Article simply reads that “Every 
human being has the inherent right to life.”166 Finally, while the Convention of the Rights of 
the Child is equivocal on the definition of the child as it defines it as every human being who 
has not obtained the age of majority, there is no direct reference to the unborn.167 In fact, the 
preparatory work again indicates that this exclusion was intentional. 
From the foregoing, it is therefore correct to say the rights of the unborn are not recognised in 
international human rights law. 
5   Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates that access to IVF in fact constitutes part of the greater regime on 






                                                           
165 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 224. 
166 Article 6(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See, Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro 
Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 225. 
167 Article 1, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS, 3. 
35 
 
CHAPTER 5; CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1  Introduction  
This chapter will conclude the study and make a determination on the legal effect of the 
extension of personhood to embryos particularly regarding their disposition. 
It will also give recommendations on an acceptable balance between reproductive rights and 
the practicality necessary in in vitro fertilization (hereafter IVF). 
5.2  Summary of the Study  
5.2.1 Chapter One  
Chapter one introduced the problem facing the assisted reproduction industry in Kenya 
particularly regarding in vitro fertilization and the disposal of excess embryos. Despite the 
practice gaining traction in Kenya, the lack of legislation or policy direction coupled by a 
potentially conflicting Constitutional Article that confers personhood to the unborn rendered 
the situation potentially untenable.  This means that practices involved in IVF like disposal of 
embryos, which is the focus of this study, are potentially illegal and any law allowing the same, 
unconstitutional. 
5.2.2 Chapter Two 
This chapter traced the conflicting property and person frameworks in discussions on embryos 
which is necessary to contextualize the problem the study attempts to solve in legal and 
jurisprudential terms and demonstrate the effect of extension of personhood to the unborn. 
The embryo as property framework seeks to apply property theories to the frozen embryos and 
under this framework, destroying any excess embryo would be perfectly justifiable as 
exercising the right to destroy. Legislation embracing this framework would therefore contain 
no restriction on embryo transfer and eventual destruction.  
Meanwhile, the embryo as a person framework seeks to extend constitutional guarantees to the 
embryo. The most controversial of these guarantees is the right to life. By stating that life begins 
at conception, our Constitution has embraced this framework and therefore any legislation we 




5.2.3 Chapter Three  
This chapter investigated the status of embryos across different jurisdictions. The aim of the 
selection of jurisdictions was to demonstrate both judicial and legislative approaches to the 
issues at hand both from balanced and extremist angles. The standout case was the Murillo 
Case that I propose as a model for a balanced and equitable interpretation of rights and interests 
involved in IVF procedures. It demonstrates that while we have adopted a personhood 
approach, this does not necessarily translate to an excessively restrictive interpretation on the 
right to life to exclude any form of IVF. 
5.2.4 Chapter Four 
Chapter four framed access to in vitro fertilization as part of reproductive freedom and 
entitlement of access to reproductive health services. It also sampled the treatment of the 
aforementioned reproductive freedom in international human rights law as well as in local 
legislation. The chapter instructively noted that our constitutional drafting of life as beginning 
at conception is the exception not the rule as far as international human rights law is concerned.  
5.3   Recommendations 
5.3.1 Need for a National Policy on IVF 
In its final report, the ICPD notably recommended that governments should provide 
appropriate standards and ethical guidelines for in vitro fertilization. This should be 
done at the Ministerial level in a way that accommodates the views of all interested 
parties including faith leaders and medical practitioners.  
5.3.2 Need for a legislation on the in vitro fertilization  
Noting the increase in people turning to in vitro fertilization, there is urgent need to 
pass legislation regulating the practice. While the progress made in drafting the In Vitro 
Fertilization Bill (2014) is laudable, Parliament need to take the final step in passing 
the Bill into law. However, drafting of the law should be done carefully and should 
include diverse opinions to achieve consensus. 
5.3.3 Need to align any law passed with the Constitution 
As mentioned earlier, Kenya affords life at conception. This means that any legislation 
has to reflect this position. As discussed earlier, the In Vitro Fertilization Bill (2014) 
contains certain ambiguities such as what is to be done to embryos once the maximum 
statutory period for storage lapses. Conventional wisdom in the industry indicates that 
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these embryos would either be donated or destroyed. Any law should thereby clarify 
this ambiguity or risk unconstitutionality and this study recommends that the legislation 
should include a provision mandating that all embryos produced have to be implanted.  
While this is a restriction of the rights of the couples, it does not constitute a severe 
interference with the right of the individual. It also fulfils the requirements set out in 
Article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) on the limitation of rights since the 
legitimacy of any law or executive policy depends on a justifiable restriction that 
protects the right to life.  
Similarly, the legislation has to ensure the rights accruing to individuals including 
reproductive freedom are not eroded.  
5.3.4 Need to provide protection for contractual agreements entered by persons 
This study recommends that the form of agreements entered into by persons willing to 
undergo the in vitro fertilization process on the disposal of embryos should be provided 
for either in legislation or through ministerial direction. The reason for this is to avoid 
any conflicts over the enforceability of these agreements by persons looking to renege 
on their contractual commitments.  
5.3.5 Need for more studies on IVF in Kenya 
This study repeatedly notes that there is a dearth of academic literature on the practice 
of IVF in Kenya. As a result of this, this study strongly recommends more inquiries 
into the practice in order to foment a coherent discussion on what needs to be done.  
Such inquiries should focus on the ethical, medical and constitutional issues in the 
practice as well as the social impacts of the same.  
This will inevitably provide better informed legislative, judicial and executive decision 
making. 
5.4   Conclusion  
By discussing the property and personhood frameworks, this study has met its first objective 
of investigating the jurisprudential debate informing the status of embryos and how it will relate 
to Kenya. It has also done a comparative analysis of comparative jurisdictions in order to learn 
judicial and legislative approaches to cases involving disposal of embryos and has thus met its 
second objective. Finally it made recommendations on an applicable legal framework on 




In agreement with the hypothesis in Chapter One, this study recommends a balanced 
interpretation of the right to life and reproductive freedom in order to maintain constitutionality 
and fairness. 
In conclusion, for many couples, IVF remains the last hope of fulfilling their longing of starting 
a family and is therefore a key part of reproductive freedom. To this end, the State should make 
attempts to ensure that unnecessary restrictions on IVF do not hinder the enjoyment of this 
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